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Abstract 
We propose a formal treatment of scenarios in 
the context of a dialectical argumentation for­
malism for qualitative reasoning about uncertain 
propositions. Our formalism extends prior work 
in which arguments for and against uncertain 
propositions were presented and compared in in­
teraction spaces called Agoras. We now define 
the notion of a scenario in this framework and use 
it to define a set of qualitative uncertainty labels 
for propositions across a collection of scenarios. 
This work is intended to lead to a formal theory 
of scenarios and scenario analysis. 
1 Introduction 
In many domains, the absence of hard data or the presence 
of conflicting perceived interests makes reaching agree­
ment on the quantification of uncertainty difficult. Argu­
mentation formalisms have been proposed for the quali­
tative representation of uncertainty in these circumstances 
(Krause et al. 1995) and have found application in intel­
ligent systems, for example in medical and safety analysis 
domains (Carbogim, Robertson, & Lee 2000). In (McBur­
ney & Parsons 2000), we proposed a formalism using di­
alectical argumentation for representing and resolving the 
arguments for and against uncertain propositions. This rep­
resentation was grounded in specific theories of rational 
human discourse and was centered on an electronic space 
for presentation of arguments, which we termed an Agora. 
In subsequent work (McBurney & Parsons 2001b), we ex­
tended this formalism and demonstrated that it had several 
desirable properties when used for inference and decision­
making. In this paper, we further extend this framework to 
enable dialectical argumentation under and between multi­
ple circumstances, or scenarios. 
The notion of scenario (Schwartz 1991) has found 
widespread application in business forecasting, in public 
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policy determination, and in scientific domains. An early 
use of the methods of scenario analysis may be seen in 
nineteenth-century statistical mechanics, where research 
sought to determine if the properties of a physical system, 
such as its entropy at a given time, depended on the sys­
tem's initial state. Ludwig Boltzmann (Boltzmann 1872) 
tackled this problem by comparing the given system to a 
collection of alternative, imaginary systems, each having 
different initial conditions - i.e., what we would now call 
scenarios. By doing so, he could potentially assess the ex­
tent to which the system property of interest was indepen­
dent of the initial system state. Josiah W. Gibbs (Gibbs 
1902) formalized the concept of a collection of alternative 
systems with his notion of ensemble, a term we also use. 
Perhaps the most important and complex recent application 
of scenario analysis has been in the work of the Intergov­
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (McCarthy et 
at. 2001 ), the UN agency tasked with assessing the current 
and possible future states of the world's ecosystem, and 
with considering and recommending appropriate environ­
mental regulatory policies. In this domain, scenario analy­
sis has been used for scientific modeling and prediction, for 
the modeling of socio-economic variables and conditions, 
and for the assessment of proposed regulatory policies and 
targets (Carter & others 2001). 
Despite their widespread use, however, there appears to be 
no formal theory of scenarios or scenario analysis. With­
out a formal theory, many questions remain without rig­
orous answers, e.g., How should scenarios be constituted? 
How many scenarios should be considered? How should 
individual scenarios be analysed? How should any differ­
ences in the likelihood of occurrence of different scenarios 
be represented? How should their relative importance be 
represented? How should reasoning be undertaken across 
a collection of scenarios, or multiple collections of scenar­
ios? In the absence of a formal theory of scenarios it is 
difficult to assess the validity or reliability of any particu­
lar application of scenario analysis, for example, the many 
analyses generated by the work ofthe IPCC (Carter & oth­
ers 2001 ). Moreover, because no computational theory of 
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scenarios yet exists, application of scenario analysis in in­
telligent systems is limited. 
The long-term aim of the research reported here is a rig­
orous, formal, computational theory of scenarios. In this 
paper, we take an initial step towards this aim, by consid­
ering one type of scenario, those based on dialectical ar­
gumentation systems. In Section 2, we review our model 
for qualitative inference in uncertain domains, which uses 
dialectical argumentation to represent conflicting, ambigu­
ous or contested information. Section 3 defines our no­
tions of scenario and ensemble, while Section 4 considers 
the question of when two scenarios may be considered dis­
tinct. Section 5 then considers how many observations we 
need to take for any debate in order to estimate its long 
term position; here we prove what we believe to be an im­
portant theorem, Proposition 4, which says that the most 
recent snapshot of a debate is at least as good, in a precise 
sense, as any combination of earlier snapshots. In Section 
6, we consider the the assignment of uncertainty labels to 
uncertain propositions on the basis of their argumentation 
status in a collection of scenarios. This is illustrated with 
an example in Section 7 and the paper concludes with a 
discussion of related work in Section 8. 
One possible response to these proposals is that scenario 
analysis is unnecessary in an argumentation context, be­
cause these frameworks have been developed precisely to 
represent conflicting or uncertain information, and to re­
solve any inconsistency in the resulting conclusions. Such 
a view is mistaken. In a typical application, we are not 
merely trying to decide whether the possible arguments for 
some given claim are, on balance, stronger or weaker than 
the arguments against it; we are also trying to identify the 
circumstances (the assumptions and allowed rules of infer­
ence) under which arguments exist for or against the claim, 
and the circumstances under which those arguments for it 
are stronger than those against it. To do this rigorously, 
we need to clearly demarcate the sets of possible circum­
stances - i.e., the scenarios - from one another and to 
compare them. 
2 Dialectical Argumentation 
In this section we briefly summarize the Agora framework 
for the qualitative representation of uncertainty presented 
in (McBurney & Parsons 2000; 2001b). In this frame­
work, arguments for and against claims are articulated by 
participants in an electronic space, called an Agora, with 
claims expressed as formulae in a propositional language. 
By means of defined locutions, participants in the Agora 
can variously posit, assert, contest, justify, rebut, undercut, 
qualify and retract claims, just as happens in real discourse. 
For example, a debate participant Pi could demonstrate her 
argument A(-+ 11) supporting a claim 11, an argument to 
which she was committed with strength D, by means of 
the locution: 
show_arg(P; :A(-+ 11, D)). 
The rules governing the use of each permitted locution are 
expressed in terms of a formal dialogue-game between the 
participants (Hamblin 1970). We assume that the Agora 
participants begin a debate with a set of agreed facts, or as­
sumptions, and an agreed set of inference rules. Because 
we want to model many forms of reasoning, these rules 
need not be deductive and may themselves, in our Agora 
formulation, be the subject of argument. 
We demonstrated the use of this framework for the rep­
resentation of uncertainty by defining a set of uncertainty 
labels assigned to claims on the basis of the arguments pre­
sented for and against them in the Agora. Essentially, one 
could say that claims have more credibility (and hence less 
uncertainty) the fewer and the weaker are the arguments 
against them. While any set of labels could be so defined, 
we drew on earlier work in argumentation (Krause et a/. 
1995) and defined the set: {Accepted, Probable, Plausi­
ble, Supported, Open}, with the elements listed in decreas­
ing order of certainty. For example, a claim was regarded 
as Probable at a particular time if at least one consistent 
argument had been presented for it in the Agora by that 
time, but no arguments for its negation (rebuttals) nor for 
the negation of any of its assumptions (undercuts) had been 
presented by then. We defined a claim as well-defended at 
a given time if there was an argument for it at that time and 
any rebuttals or undercuts had themselves been subject to 
counter-rebuttals or to undercuts. Accepted claims at any 
time were defined as those which are well-defended at that 
time.1 
As arguments for and against a proposition are presented to 
the Agora, the status of a proposition may rise and fall: a 
claim considered Probable at one time may be only Plau­
sible later, and then be Accepted later again. We therefore 
defined the truth-valuation of a claim e at time t, denoted 
Vt(B), to be 1 if e had the label Accepted at this time, oth­
erwise it was 0. Such a valuation summarizes the knowl­
edge of the community of debate participants at the partic­
ular time, since it incorporates, via the definitions of the la­
bels, all the arguments for and against e articulated to that 
time. Consequently, assessing the truth-status of a claim 
at a particular time can be viewed as taking a snapshot of 
an Agora debate. Of course, because these definitions are 
time-dependent, and arguments may be articulated in the 
Agora at any time, such an assignment of uncertainty labels 
and truth valuation must be defeasible. Claims accepted at 
one time may be overturned at another, in the light of new 
information learnt or arguments presented subsequently. 
In using the Agora framework to represent uncertainty, at-
1 These labels are assigned on the basis of the arguments pre­
sented by all participants in the Agora; thus, individual partici­
pants may not agree with any label assignment, since their own 
arguments will typically only be a subset of those presented. 
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tention will focus on the truth valuation function over the 
long-run2 The sequence (v1(B) It= 1, 2, . . .  ) may or may 
not converge as t --* oo. Suppose that it does converge, and 
denote its limit value by v00(B). What will the value of a 
snapshot taken at timet, namely Vt (B), tell us about v00 (B)? 
Of course, since any finite snapshot risks being overtaken 
by subsequent information or arguments, we cannot infer 
with complete accuracy from the finite snapshot to the infi­
nite value. However, we have shown (McBurney & Parsons 
200lb) that, under certain conditions, we can place a bound 
on the likelihood that such an inference is in error. The con­
ditions essentially require that: (a) the snapshot is taken at 
a time after commencement sufficient for all the arguments 
using the initial information to have been presented, and 
(b) there is a bound on the probability that new informa­
tion arises following the snapshot. This result is proved as 
Proposition 7 of (McBurney & Parsons 200lb), which we 
reproduce here. For this, we first need some definitions. 
Definition 1: We write LEe for the statement: " The func­
tion v1(B) converges to a finite limit as t --* oo." We also 
write X1,e for the statement: "New information relevant to 
B becomes known to an Agora participant after time t." 
In general, at any time s, we do not know whether new evi­
dence will become available to Agora participants at a later 
timet or not. Consequently, the variables X1,e, fort not in 
the past, represent uncertain events. Also uncertain for the 
same reason are statements concerning the future values of 
Vt (B) for any B. Because these events are uncertain, we as­
sume the existence of a probability function over them, i.e., 
a real-valued measure function mapping such statements to 
[0 , 1] which satisfies the axioms of probability. 
Definition 2: Pr(.) is a probability function defined over 
statements of the form Xt,e and statements concerning the 
values of Vt (B), for any formula B. 
Proposition 1: [Proposition 7 of (McBurney & Parsons 
200lb)] Let B be a formula and suppose that all arguments 
pertaining to Band using the information available at com­
mencement are articulated by participants by some time 
s > 0. Suppose further that Vt� (B) = 1 for some tm � s. 
Also, assume that Pr(Xt�,e) ::; E, for some E E [0, 1]. 
Then the following inequalities hold: 
Pr(LEe and v00(B) = 11 Vt�(B) = 1) � 1- E. 
Pr(LEe and V00(B) = 0 I v1� (B) = 1) ::; c. D 
Like the standard (Neyman-Pearson) procedures for statis­
tical hypothesis testing, this proposition provides us with 
some confidence in our use of finite snapshots to make in­
ferences about the long-run truth-valuation function for a 
debate. While such inference is not deductively valid, at 
2Strictly, we are assuming throughout that time in the Agora 
is discrete, and can be represented by a countably-infinite set. 
least its likelihood of error may be bounded. 3 In the sec­
tions below, we will be comparing the results of debates in 
more than one Agora. We therefore assume that we have 
a single probability function Pr defined across all the rel­
evant statements. We will also index symbols with super­
scripts e, 2, etc) to denote the Agora to which they refer. 
We next define the concept of Scenario. 
3 Scenarios and Ensembles 
The framework we have just outlined provides a means to 
represent the diverse arguments that may be derived from 
a given set of assumptions, by means of a given set of in­
ference rules (deductive or otherwise). If we were to start 
with a different set of assumptions, and/or permit the use 
of different inference rules, the arguments presented in the 
Agora could well be different. As a result, the uncertainty 
labels and truth values assigned to formulae could also be 
different, both when taken at finite snapshots and in the 
limit. Each collection of alternative sets of assumptions 
and inference rules we call a scenario, which we define as 
follows: 
Definition 3: A Scenario for a given domain consists of 
a set of assumptions and a set of inference rules, with 
which participants are equipped at the commencement of 
an Agora debate over propositions in that domain. We de­
note scenarios for a given domain by S1, S2, • • •  , etc. For 
each scenario, Si, an Agora debate undertaken with the 
assumptions and inference rules of that scenario, is said to 
be the associated Agora, denoted A i. We assume only one 
debate is conducted in association with any scenario. 
Because we wish to reason across multiple scenarios, we 
also define: 
Definition 4: An Ensemble S is a finite collection of dis­
tinct Scenarios { S1, ... , sm} relating to a common do­
main. We assume that, associated with each scenario 
Si E S, is a real-number, a i E [0 , 1], called its sce­
nario weight. We call a = (a 1 , a2, ... , am) the ensemble 
weights vector of S. 
We do not assume the weights sum to unity across the m 
scenarios, although they may do so. The weights may vary 
with time, but, if so, we assume that their assignment to 
scenarios is independent of the dialectical status of claims 
in the corresponding debates. This assumption is made be­
cause the assignment of weights to scenarios should be on 
the basis of characteristics of the scenarios themselves, not 
on the basis of arguments which ensue or don't ensue in the 
associated Agora debates. 
30ne may object that we can never know the value of E. While 
this is true, participants in a debate are often quite willing to pro­
vide subjective estimates for such probability bounds. Scientists, 
for example, will often estimate the chance that new information 
will emerge in future which will overturn an established theory. 
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What interpretation we give to the weights depends upon 
the meanings we give to the logical language, to the sce­
narios and to arguments for claims in the corresponding 
Agora debates. For example, the assumptions and claims 
may represent objects in the physical world, and the in­
ference rules physical manipulations of these objects, such 
as actual construction of new objects from existing ones. 
Scenarios can thus be interpreted as different sets of re­
sourcing assumptions, with claims being well-defended in 
an Agora debate when the objects they represent are able 
to be constructed with the assumed resources. In this in­
terpretation, the weights attached to scenarios may be the 
relative costs or benefits of different resources, or their like­
lihoods of occurrence. A second interpretation could arise 
where the scenarios represent alternative sets of rules of 
procedure for interaction between a group of participants, 
for example, in a legal domain or in automated negotiation. 
Here the rules of inference may represent different allow­
able modes of reasoning, such as reasoning by analogy or 
from authority. The weights may represent the extent of 
compliance of each scenario with some set of principles of 
rational discourse, such as those of (Hitchcock 1991), or 
with some normative economic or political theory. Finally, 
a third interpretation would have the scenarios as different 
descriptions of some uncertain domain, for example differ­
ent scientific theories, with propositions being statements 
about the domain, and the inference rules representing dif­
ferent causal mechanisms. The scenario weights could be 
relative likelihoods of occurrence, or valuations of relative 
importance or utility. This third interpretation is the one we 
will consider in this paper. 
4 Comparing Scenarios 
4.1 Comparing two long-run debates 
Our definition of an Ensemble says that the scenarios in­
cluded must be distinct. We require this so that when ag­
gregating across scenarios we do not engage in "double­
counting" of separate scenarios which are really the same. 
When are two scenarios the same? Obviously, we may con­
sider them to be the same when they have identical sets of 
assumptions and inference rules. But two scenarios iden­
tical in this fashion may result in very different Agora de­
bates, as different arguments may be presented in each, or 
the same arguments may be presented at different times. 
It is not clear, therefore, that identical scenarios will lead 
to identical assignments of truth-labels, even over the long­
run; we show that, under certain conditions, they will do so. 
Throughout this section S 1 and S2 will be two scenarios of 
interest, and A 1 and A 2 their associated Agora debates. 
Proposition 2: Let () be a claim. Suppose that S 1 and S2 
are identical scenarios, i.e., they have identical sets of as­
sumptions and identical sets of inference rules. Suppose 
that in the corresponding Agora debates, A 1 and A2, all 
possible arguments based on the initial assumptions and 
using the inference rules are eventually articulated. Sup­
pose further that no new information is presented to either 
debate following commencement. Then, the long-run truth 
status of() in each debate is the same. 
Outline of Proof: Given the premises, the only way the 
two debates will potentially differ will be in the order that 
arguments are articulated. But if all arguments are even­
tually articulated, then after some finite time no further ar­
guments will be presented in either debate. The definitions 
of the truth valuation functions in (McBurney & Parsons 
2001b) depend only the arguments which have been pre­
sented at any time, and not their order of presentation. The 
proposition follows. 0 
If we relax the assumption that no new information ar­
rives in either debate our conclusion acquires a probabilis­
tic qualification. W hile this does not guarantee that two 
identical scenarios always lead to identical long-run truth 
assignments, it does bound the likelihood that such is not 
the case. 
Proposition 3: Let (), S1 and S2 be as before. Suppose 
there exist upper bounds Ei E [0, 1] for the probability that 
new information arrives after commencement in debate i, 
i.e., that Pr(XJ,e) ::; E
i, for i = 1, 2. Then we have: 
Outline of Proof: By the previous result, the two long-run 
assignments of truth to () are only different if one or other 
debate receives new information. The probability that this 
occurs is less than or equal to the sum of the probabilities 
that either debate receives new information less the prob­
ability that they both do. This latter event has probability 
greater than or equal to zero, and the inequality follows by 
algebraic manipulation. 0 
4.2 A decision rule for scenario comparison 
We now provide a decision rule for determining if two sce­
narios S1 and S2 are the same. This decision rule clas­
sifies scenarios into two classes, labeled distinct and non­
distinct. The rule proposed for determination of distinct­
ness of scenarios uses two criteria (in order of application): 
(a) whether or not the two scenarios have identical assump­
tions and inference rules; (b) in the case where they do, 
whether or not either scenario is judged to have a high prob­
ability of receiving new information. 
Case 1: S1 f. S2• Conclude that the two scenarios are 
distinct. 
Case 2A: S1 = S2 and Pr(XJ e), Pr(XJ e) both small. 
In this case, the likelihood �f new info�ation arising 
in either scenario is small and Proposition 3 allows us 
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to infer that v�(B) = v�(B) with high probability. 
Conclude that the two scenarios are non-distinct. 
Case 2B: S1 = S2 and one or both of 
Pr(XJ,0), Pr(XJ,e) large. In this case, the likelihood 
of new information arising in at least one scenario 
is large, and thus, Proposition 3, it is unlikely that 
v�(B) = v�(B). Conclude that the two scenarios are 
distinct.4 
In the first case, where the two scenarios have different 
premises and/or inference rules, we classify them as dis­
tinct. Two such distinct scenarios, of course, may result in 
the same arguments being presented in both scenarios af­
ter some finite time. In the other two cases (Cases 2A and 
2B), where the underlying assumptions and inference rules 
are the same in the two scenarios, Proposition 2 says that 
the long run truth assignments for {I in the corresponding 
Agora debates, if they exist, will be identical, provided no 
new information is presented in either Agora debate fol­
lowing commencement. If new information is presented, 
then Proposition 3 provides a bound for the probability that 
the long-run truth assignments are the same, in terms of 
the probabilities of new information being received. In the 
case (Case 2A) when these probabilities are believed to be 
small, the two long-run truth assignments are most likely 
identical, and we can classify the two scenarios as being 
the same. In the other case (Case 2B), where one or both 
probabilities are large, we classify the two scenarios as not 
the same. 
Note that, although under Cases 2A and 2B we are mak­
ing inferences about the long run truth assignments, v � (B) 
and v� (B), these inferences are based only on the premises 
and inference rules used and assessments of the probability 
of new information being received after commencement of 
the associated Agora debates. These inferences, and hence 
this classification, do not depend on the progress or status 
of the debates themselves. In other words, our classifica­
tion of scenarios is not based on the output of the debates 
conducted under the scenarios. 
5 Observing Agora debates 
What may we feasibly observe about an Agora debate? 
Firstly, we could take a snapshot at a particular finite time 
after commencement. Or, secondly, we could take a num­
ber of such snapshots. Or, thirdly, we could examine the 
actual arguments used in a debate from commencement up 
to a particular time. In the first subsection below, we show 
that taking the most recent snapshot is at least as good an 
indicator of the long run status of a debate as any other 
combination of earlier snapshots. In other words, we need 
4Note that the meanings of "small" and "large" may be do­
main dependent. 
only take one snapshot to capture all the information avail­
able in a debate. In the second subsection we consider how 
we may compare a snapshot from one debate with that from 
another. The third approach - considering the arguments 
themselves - we leave for another occasion. As before, 
we denote the long-run truth status of a formula {I in debate 
i, if this limit exists, by vt,(B) = limt-+oo vf(B). The sub­
sections which follow will discuss finite estimators of this 
long-run value, estimators we denote by iJ t, (B). 
5.1 Observing a debate 
Suppose that we have multiple snapshots of a debate, i.e., 
for a debate A we have a sequence of observations of the 
truth-status of B: VI(B),vz(B), ... ,vn(B). These values 
are all either zero or one, and each is an estimate for the 
long-run truth status v oo (B) of B. Given such multiple es­
timates, there are a number of ways we could combine 
them to produce a single estimate of v00(B), for example: 
(a) The mean, which is the sum of the observed snapshot 
values, divided by n; (b) An a, ,8-trimmed mean, which 
is the mean calculated after first ranking the observations 
in ascending order and then deleting a % of the observa­
tions at the lower end and ,8 % at the upper end (Huber 
1981). For instance, we may delete those at the begin­
ning of the sequence, on an assumption that early values 
of Vt (B) will oscillate as all the relevant arguments are pre­
sented to the Agora; (c) the mode, the most common value, 
i.e., whichever of 0 or 1 appears most frequently in the n 
observations; etc. 
However, each truth-valuation v k is defined in terms of the 
arguments presented to the Agora up to time k, so, in some 
sense, each observation summarizes all the information rel­
evant to B up to and including the time the observation was 
made. We should therefore expect the final observation, v n 
to contain the most information, and so to be the best es­
timator (in some sense) of the long-run value, v00•5 This 
is indeed the case, as the following theorem shows. For 
simplicity, we omit {I from the notation. 
Proposition 4: Let VI, vz, ... , Vn be a sequence of n snap­
shot values concerning B taken from a debate A. Suppose 
the limit V00 = limn->oo Vn exists. Let Vn be the estimator 
of V00 using only the final observation in such a sequence. 
Further, let iJ� be any estimator of v00 based on these n 
observations which converges to a finite limit as n -+ oo. 
Then: 
lim Pr([vn - Voo I � liJ� - Voo I) = 1. n->oo 
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. If the result does 
not hold, then there must exist £ > 0 such that: 
lim Pr(lvn - voo l > liJ�- Vooi) = £ --,---.:!n=->::.:oo:::: 
5 Note that the final observation is itself an a, iJ-trimmed mean. 
332 MCBURNEY & PARSONS UAI2002 
Then, there must be infinitely many m such that lvm -
v00 I > lv;;, - V00 I· Since the sequence of final values Vn is 
a sequence of zeros or ones, and it converges to v 00, then 
for each of these m, we have one of two cases: 
[v00 = 1:] By the strict inequality, we must have Vm = 0. 
[v00 = 0:] Likewise, we must have Vm = 1 
But this happens for infinitely many values m, which con­
tradicts the assumption that Vn converges to v00• 0 
This result shows that the final observation of a sequence of 
snapshots is at least as good, in the long run, as any other 
convergent estimator of v 00 based on this sequence. We 
therefore need only consider the most recent snapshot in 
any assessment of the truth status of a claim in a debate. 
5.2 Comparing two debates 
We now consider the comparison of two Agora debates, 
undertaken under different scenarios, by means of finite 
snapshots of each at a particular time t after commence­
ment. Each snapshot, vj(8), will give us an assessment of 
the long-term truth-status of a claim 8 in each debate A i, 
fori= 1, 2. That is, we set v�(8) = vi(8). Proposition I 
tells us that we can bound the probability of error in infer­
ring from the finite estimate v � ( 8) to the true infinite limit 
value v � ( 8). Can we also bound the probability of error 
when inferring from a comparison of the finite values? The 
next proposition provides such bounds. 
Proposition 5: Let e be a formula, and let A I, A2 be 
two Agora debates associated with scenarios S 1, S2 re­
spectively. Suppose that, in debate A i ( i = 1, 2 J, all ar­
guments pertaining to e and using the information avail­
able at commencement are articulated by participants by 
some time s; > 0. Suppose further that there is a time 
m 2: max(s1,s2), such thatv;.(8) = v;;.(e). Also, as­
sume that there exist €1,€2 E [0, 1], possible dependent on 
m, such that each Pr(X/, 9) � €;. Then the following four 
inequalities hold: 
' 
1. Pr(LEJ and LE� and v�(B) = v;,(e) I 
v;.(e) = v;;.(e)) 2: 1- e1- €2. 
2. Pr(LEJ and LE� and v�(8) =F v;,(e) I 
v;.(e) = v;;,(8) ) � €1 + €2. 
3. Pr(LEJ and LE� and v�(B) = v;,(B) I 
v;.(e) =F v;;.(e)) � €j + €2. 
4. Pr(LEJ and LE� and v�(B) =F v;,(e) I 
v;.(e) =F v;;.(e)) 2: 1- €1- e2. 
Proof. Arguments similar to Proposition 3. 0 
Using simultaneous finite snapshots of two debates to make 
an inference about the long-run truth-status of a formula is 
a process prone to error. This result says that, under certain 
circumstances, we can bound the probability of such er­
rors. The "certain circumstances" relate to the timing of the 
snapshots - which must be long enough into the two de­
bates for all the arguments based on the initial information 
to have been presented - and to the probabilities of new 
information being presented to each debate subsequent to 
the snapshots being taken. As one would expect, the error 
bounds are functions of these probabilities. 6 
In proving this result, we have not assumed that the event 
of new information being presented to one Agora debate 
is independent of new information being presented to the 
other. If we were able to make such an assumption, our er­
ror bounds would be tighter, with the product € 1 €2 added 
to the right-hand side of the first and fourth inequalities 
and subtracted from the second and third. Independence 
of these two events is a function of how "distinct" are the 
two scenarios. Scenarios in the same domain which are 
very similar are likely to experience new information con­
currently; participants in the corresponding debates are also 
likely to make similar assessments of the relevance of such 
new information. 
6 Reasoning across Scenarios 
Scenario analysis is typically used to answer one or more 
questions about an application domain. Users may wish to 
know whether some proposition 8 is true under any sce­
nario at all, e.g., Is 8 possible? If it is possible, they may 
wish to then know the proportion of scenarios in which this 
is the case, e.g., How likely is 8? Indeed, in the extreme all 
scenarios will be considered in order to answer the ques­
tion, Is 8 inevitable? Guided by these questions, we now 
define a set of qualitative labels to express the truth status of 
a claim 8 across multiple, distinct scenarios. To do this, we 
assume throughout this section that we have an ensemble 
S = { S1, S2, . . •  , sm}, each Si with an associated Agora 
debate A i, and with associated scenario weight a i. We as­
sume 8 is some uncertain proposition and we denote the 
truth valuation of 8 in Agora debate A i at time t by vi ( 8), 
fori= 1, ... ,m. 
Definition 5: Given an ensembleS and a proposition 8, we 
define the Ensemble support for 8 at time t by 
s(e) = I:;':.I 
aivt(B) 
mt ""'m i Wi=l 
a 
6Qne could also view each sequence as arising from a ran­
dom process, and so view the comparison problem as a test of 
an hypothesis that the two sequences are governed by the same 
probability distribution. Because the form of the distributions is 
not specified, the appropriate test would be nonparametric, e.g., 
the Kolmogorov-Smimov two-sample test (Gibbons 1985). How­
ever, the asymptotic theory for even these tests requires that the 
underlying distributions be continuous and that the two samples 
be drawn independently. Neither assumption is appropriate here. 
-; 
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Given a fixed real number c E (0, 0.5), we now define var­
ious classes of support, as follows: 
8 is said to be Inevitable at time t precisely when 
mf ( 8) = 1. This class of propositions is denoted 
AI,t· 
8 is said to be 100(1 - c) %-Certain at timet precisely 
when mf (8) 2': 1- c. This class is denoted Al-<,t· 
8 is said to be Probable at time t precisely when 
mf(8) 2': 0.5. This class is denoted AP,t· 
8 is said to be lOOc% -Possible at time t precisely when 
mf (8) 2': c. This class is denoted Ae,t· 
8 is said to be Open at timet if it is a well-formed formula 
of the logical language over which Agora debates are 
conducted. This class is denoted Ao,t· 
Following from these definitions, we have an inclusion hi­
erarchy on these classes of propositions: 
Proposition 6: For a fixed c E (0, 0.5) and timet, 
D 
We can then assign qualitative labels to any proposition 8 
according to which of these sets it belongs to. Note that 
in any one Agora debate, arguments may be presented for 
both 8 and for -,8, and, indeed, it is possible for both propo­
sitions to be well-defended in the same debate simultane­
ously.7 Thus it is not necessarily the case, in this frame­
work, that there is any complementarity between the un­
certainty label assigned to a proposition 8 and the label as­
signed to its negation; both propositions may be assigned 
Probable, for example, or both 75%-Certain, depending on 
the arguments which support them. 
7 Example 
Given space limitations, our example is very simplified, 
and really only illustrates the concept of assigning uncer­
tainty labels across an ensemble of scenarios. 8 We consider 
the situation facing an intending operator of global mo­
bile satellite-based telecommunications services (GMSS) 
in 1990 (McBurney & Parsons 2002). Demand for these 
7This is essentially because each claim may be defended by 
arguments which do not attack each other. An interesting ques­
tion is under what circumstances the Ensemble Support function 
satisfies the axioms of probability. We conjecture that this is so if 
the attack relationship between arguments only permits rebuttals 
and not undercuts, thereby ensuring that every argument which 
attacks a claim is also an argument for its negation. 
8In particular, we do not illustrate the working of the argumen­
tation apparatus over time within the Agora debate under each 
scenario, since this is presented in (McBurney & Parsons 200lb). 
services was predicted to depend heavily on the extent to 
which terrestrial mobile communications services would 
expand, both in terms of customer numbers and the geo­
graphic area under coverage. One could imagine a num­
ber of scenarios for the future, under each of which there 
would be arguments for and against the claim that demand 
for GMSS would be large. We consider an ensemble of 
three scenarios, which can readily be seen to be distinct: 
Scenario 1: Terrestrial mobile services expand rapidly 
and customers wish to use their phone everywhere, 
both inside and outside terrestrial coverage. Argu­
ment: Large numbers of terrestrial customers leads to 
high demand for GMSS outside terrestrial coverage. 
Scenario 2: Terrestrial mobile services expand rapidly 
and customers are happy with the terrestrial coverage, 
not wishing to use it outside. Argument: Large ge­
ographic coverage for terrestrial services leads to low 
demand for GMSS, as most of the world has coverage. 
Scenario 3: Terrestrial mobile services do not expand, but 
customers wish to use their phone everywhere, both 
inside and outside terrestrial coverage. Argument: 
Small geographic terrestrial coverage means high de­
mand for GMSS. 
Recall that scenario weights are assigned independently of 
the arguments under each scenario; assume this ensemble 
has a weights vector of the likelihoods (0. 7, 0. 7, 0.3). Sup­
pose c = 0.05. Let 8 be the claim: "GMSS experiences 
high demand" There are well-defended arguments for 8 
in Scenarios I and 3, which have respective weights of0.7 
and 0.3. Thus we can say that 8 is 5%-Possible. Since 
(0.7 + 0.3)/(0.7 + 0.7 + 0.3) = 0.59, we can also con­
clude that 8 is probable, but not that it is 95%-Certain or 
Inevitable. We have thus assigned an uncertainty label to 
the proposition 8, on the basis of its argumentation status 
within each scenario and taking into account the assumed 
relative weights of each scenario. 
8 Discussion 
Despite their widespread use, there is as yet no formal, 
computational theory of scenarios and scenario analysis. 
In this paper, we have commenced work on such a theory 
for scenarios which describe debates over uncertain propo­
sitions. In our formalism a scenario is a set of specified 
premises and inference rules, which participants to a de­
bate use to engage in argument. We have presented a rule 
for determining whether two such scenarios are distinct or 
not, based only on their respective premises and inference 
rules, and on estimates of the probability that each debate 
will receive new information in the future. We have also 
shown that, when using finite snapshots of a debate to es­
timate the long-run truth status of a proposition, it is suf-
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ficient to use the most recent snapshot; this is at least as 
good (in a precise sense) as using earlier snapshots. We 
then defined a set of qualitative uncertainty labels for the 
truth status of claims when debates have been conducted 
under multiple, distinct scenarios. These labels provide a 
means to aggregate across the scenarios in a formal man­
ner. Assigning weights to the scenarios - for example, to 
represent their relative probabilities of occurrence - en­
ables the aggregate-level labels to be used to predict the 
truth-status of claims in the world beyond the debates. 
The work presented here is novel. The closest work we 
have found used cellular automata to define a mathematical 
theory of computer simulations (Barrett & Reidys 1999), 
but this work has not yet considered inference from a col­
lection of simulations. Our use of multiple simultaneous 
debates (scenarios) is conceptually similar to other work in 
AI using multiple possible worlds. For example, in the Ents 
model of belief of (Paris & Vencovska 1993), an agent's be­
lief in a claim is determined by imagining possible worlds 
in which the claim is decided, either true or false, and then 
belief in the claim is set equal to the proportion of possi­
ble worlds in which it is true. In this model, the possible 
worlds are assumed equi-probable. This is also a feature 
of the model of (Bacchus et a/. 1996), which assigns de­
grees of belief to propositions on the basis of the proportion 
of possible worlds in which there is evidence for them. In 
contrast, our approach allows scenarios (possible worlds) 
to be weighted differentially. Moreover, our approach pro­
vides a mechanism for deciding the truth-status of proposi­
tions within in each scenario, that of (McBurney & Parsons 
2001b). Within AI, scenarios have also been used, e.g., as 
alternative possible explanations in probabilistic causal in­
fluence models (Henrion & Druzdzel 1991). 
One criticism of the framework above is the possible sen­
sitivity of conclusions to the particular weights assigned to 
scenarios. In future work we will seek to formalize the 
process of assigning ensemble weights, and to extend this 
overall approach beyond argumentation contexts. Poten­
tial applications will then include intelligent systems to aid 
decision-making in environmental domains (McBurney & 
Parsons 2001 a), and assessment of scenario analysis in the 
climate change arena. 
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